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Abstract: This paper deals with the relationships between plural form and 
performance in franchising networks in Europe. It is proposed that a franchisor‟s 
life cycle stage and human capital assets influence the relationship between plural 
form and performance. The model has been estimated using panel data on 41 
publicly listed European franchising networks in the 1998-2007 period. The 
proportion of network-franchised units to the total number of its units in its 
distribution system is used as the indicator of its plural form (franchise 
proportion). Following an instrumental approach, the network performance is 
measured at the franchisor level by its industry-adjusted Return on Assets (ROA) 
and a relative stock market valuation measure of intangible human capital is used. 
The early results show that the impact of franchise proportion on performance is 
greater for franchisors with high intangible human capital compared to franchisors 
with low intangible human capital. Overall, results provide support for the 
contention that the franchisors‟ performance is contingent on the „fit‟ between 
governance structure (franchise proportion) and resources (critical human assets). 
In contrast, strong evidence that the governance/performance relationship is 
contingent on life cycle stage or franchisor‟s age is not found. But, our results 
suggest that franchisor‟s age could weaken the relationship between franchise 
proportion and performance. These results might suggest that younger franchisors 
with high human capital should increase their franchise proportion to enhance 
their financial performance.  
Acknowledgement: The authors thank the Agence Nationale de la Recherche 
(French National Agency for Research) for financial support (n°ANR-08-BLAN-
0020-01). 
1 Introduction 
The plural form, a combination of both franchised and company-owned units 
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within a same network, is now widely used within franchising networks (Bradach 
1997, 1998; Dant and Kaufmann 2003). Although there is no ideal mix between 
these two arrangements
†
, the simultaneous existence of both forms results in 
synergies at the network level. This article examines the relationship between 
plural form and performance using the context of franchising in Europe.  
In recent years, many studies on plural form have been published (Bürkle and 
Posselt 2008; Ehrmann and Spranger 2004; Lafontaine and Shaw 2005). However, 
there are fewer insights into performance implications of the plural form; except 
using the DEA method in the hotel industry (Botti et al. 2009; Perrigot et al. 2009) 
or developing relationships between the performance of a franchise chain and the 
resources provided to outlets and opportunism and knowledge considerations 
(Barthélemy 2008) or assessing performance through survival analysis (Perrigot 
2008; Shane and Foo 1999). As Heide (2003, p. 27) notes, “the specific 
performance implications of plural systems remain unanswered; …establishing a 
link between particular governance approaches and outcome variables seems an 
important research priority”. In this article, we examine the following research 
questions: how does a franchisor‟s plural form organization affect its 
performance? We apply the „critical‟ assets view of control of Rajan and Zingales 
(2000), which states that access to critical assets (franchisor‟s know-how, business 
format and brand name but also franchisee‟s intangible human assets) influences 
the tendency toward plural form (proportion of franchisee-owned outlets). It is 
proposed that the impact of plural form on the performance of the network is 
moderated by the value of intangible human assets and the life cycle stage of the 
franchisor. 
The model is based on panel data from 41 publicly listed European franchising 
networks in the 1998-2007 period, resulting in 237 observations. The focus is on 
the European market at a multi-industry-level, contrary to previous studies, which 
have mainly analyzed the US market in one specific industry. The proportion of a 
network‟s franchised units to the total number of its units in its distribution system 
is used as the indicator of its plural form (franchise proportion). Following an 
instrumental approach (Jones 1995), the network‟s performance at the franchisor 
level is measured by its industry-adjusted Return on Assets (ROA) using a relative 
stock market valuation measure of human capital intangibles (Pantzalis and Park 
2009). It is assumed that franchising has the same legal definition throughout the 
European countries because selected companies are all business format 
franchising oriented. In some countries franchising is defined differently (Dant et 
al. 2008) and thus international studies should be made cautiously in franchising 
research. 
The article is organized as follows: in the next section, plural form networks and 
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 Even though franchisors can have a desired proportion of franchisees. Lafontaine 
and Kaufmann (1994) encourages researchers to find an optimal proportion of 
franchised outlets. 
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several theories, which propose to assess their financial performance, are defined 
and the „critical‟ assets approach of Rajan and Zingales (2000) is proposed. 
Hence, the hypotheses were developed using this approach. In the subsequent 
sections, the data and the model estimation procedure are described, and then the 
results are presented. The article concludes with a discussion of the study‟s 
contributions, its limitations, and opportunities for further research. 
2 Literature review 
After some consideration of plural forms, several theories are described and their 
capacity to assess the link between this organizational form and its financial 
performance is examined using agency theory, resource scarcity theory and 
optimal risk allocation theory. Then, the approach based on the „critical‟ assets 
view of Rajan and Zingales is presented. 
2.1 Plural form 
The concept of plural form was defined by Bradach and Eccles (1989) and studied 
by Bradach (1997). It is the combination of both franchised and company-owned 
units within a same network. Although there is no ideal mix, the simultaneous 
presence of both forms results in synergies at the network level (Bradach 1998). It 
is therefore widely used, now, within franchising networks in different industries. 
In this article, we define the proportion of network franchisee-owned units to the 
total number of units in its distribution system as the indicator of its plural form 
(franchise proportion).  
Researchers from various areas such as economics, marketing, entrepreneurship, 
strategic management, etc., have enriched the growing franchising literature 
(Combs et al. 2004). Their theoretical approaches have mostly been grounded in 
agency theory and resource scarcity theory. According to agency theory, 
franchising acts as a governance mechanism to improve the alignment between 
firm- and unit-level incentives. The resource scarcity theory views franchising as a 
governance mechanism that relaxes the franchisor‟s financial and managerial 
constraints during the development stage of the network. Oxenfeldt and Kelly 
(1968) explained through their concept of ownership redirection, that firms 
franchise in order to gain access to the scarce financial and managerial resources 
that are initially needed. Following this thesis, firms should first franchise and 
then repurchase the most profitable units. 
These two main theories are complementary because they argue that a firm must 
attract resources and align incentives. Recently, Bürkle and Posselt (2008) 
contributed a new theory, taking into account the franchisor‟s risk considerations‡. 
According to these authors, the costs of risk and controlling franchised units 
explain the varying proportion of franchisee-owned to total units, and the 
                                                 
‡
 In finance, the term “risk” is used to refer to the variability of uncertain 
outcomes (the chance of the loss of money or of receiving less than was expected). 
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incentive to franchise decreases with an increasing proportion of franchisee-
owned to total units, as well as with decreasing costs of control. In this article, a 
novel explanation for the existence of plural form networks based on the 
governance view of Rajan and Zingales (2000) is presented. 
2.2 Agency theory 
Agency theory (Fama and Jensen 1983) is one of the major theories used to 
explain franchising (Mathewson and Winter 1985; Brickley and Dark 1987; 
Lafontaine 1992). Potential shirking by the agent is a widely discussed problem in 
franchise literature (Rubin 1978; Brickley and Dark 1987). Salaried managers may 
not always put forth their best efforts and therefore may exhibit sub-optimal 
performance. In order to reduce this moral hazard, a non-franchised firm may need 
to develop a costly monitoring system. Franchising, on the other hand, addresses 
this problem by providing powerful incentives for the owner/manager of the 
franchised unit to perform well. For example, owner/managers (i.e., the 
franchisees) have a direct claim to the residual profits of their units (Knott and 
McKelvey 1999). Also, because the franchisees have put their own capital at risk, 
they have a powerful incentive to insure the success of their franchised units 
(Brickley and Dark 1987). Because franchising aligns the interests of the two 
parties (the franchisor and the franchisee), there is less need for monitoring and a 
greater probability for maximum performance by the franchisee (Lafontaine 
1992). Better performance by the franchisees should translate into improved 
performance by the franchisor, as the franchisor‟s performance depends to a large 
extent on its franchisees‟ performance. However, agency theory accounts suggest 
some disadvantages of plural form as well, including potential underinvestment 
and free riding by franchisees (Bergen et al. 1992; Martin 1988). 
2.3 Resource scarcity theory 
An alternative theory explains franchising as a solution to the capital, managerial 
and informational constraints faced by expanding firms (Oxenfeldt and Kelly 
1968; Caves and Murphy 1976; Norton 1988; Carney and Gedajlovic 1991; Shane 
1996). This theory argues that expanding firms use franchising to get access to 
scarce capital (the franchisee‟s capital) in a cost effective way. A young 
expanding firm has two options to acquire the capital it needs: equity or 
franchising. A third option is debt, which may not be a possibility in the early 
stages of a firm‟s existence due to the high information asymmetry between the 
franchisor and external suppliers of capital. Selling franchises may therefore be 
the more cost effective and realistic option (Dant and Kaufmann 2003) despite 
contrary opinion in the literature (Rubin 1978). Furthermore, franchisees may be 
able to provide capital to the franchisor at a lower cost than passive investors 
(Combs and Ketchen 1999). In addition to capital, franchising also provides an 
efficient way to obtain the managerial expertise needed to help the business grow. 
Because franchisees put a significant amount of their assets and time into their 
units, they are likely to purchase a franchise only if they are confident in their 
managerial abilities (Shane 1996). Thus franchising addresses the adverse 
selection problem of firms hiring managers who may overstate their qualifications 
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to secure employment. Franchising also allows a firm to leverage the local market 
knowledge of its franchisees as it expands into new geographic areas (Minkler 
1990) even though information from franchisees rarely feed back the franchisor 
(Bradach 1998): it is one of the reasons why this latter author enhances the role of 
plural form networks. Low-cost capital, motivated managerial expertise, and better 
local market knowledge are three key resources that should reduce a franchisor‟s 
overall risk and have a significant, positive impact on a franchisor‟s performance. 
2.4 Risk-based Explanation of Plural form 
Bürkle and Posselt (2008) offer a model based on considerations of risk and 
control costs, which explains the proportion of franchisee-owned outlets in a 
system. They suggest considering franchising as a mechanism to reduce the 
franchisor‟s risk. Although franchising increases the risk costs for the franchisee, 
the franchisor‟s saving of risk costs with each franchisee-owned unit may even be 
larger. As they show, an increasing proportion of franchisee-owned units creates 
an increasingly weaker incentive to transfer further units to franchisees, because 
the savings in (marginal) risk costs constantly decline. If a franchisor chooses the 
optimal proportion of franchisee-owned units then its overall risk should decrease 
and its financial performance should increase. The model of Blair and Kaserman 
(1982) is developed differently but it leads to conclusions that are congruent with 
that of Bürkle and Posselt (2008). 
2.5 A ‘critical’ asset view of plural form 
Rajan and Zingales (2000) argue that the greatest governance challenge firms face 
today is that of the demise of traditional sources of authority. Ownership and 
investments in physical assets were traditionally considered as having great 
influence on firm performance (Thomas et al. 1990). As firms become 
increasingly human-capital-intensive and as knowledge-based assets have 
replaced physical assets, intangible (and inalienable) assets have replaced tangible 
assets as the firms‟ main source of value. The enterprise in today‟s competitive 
marketplace needs more than ownership of tangible assets to exercise control over 
critical (valuable) assets
§
. Rajan and Zingales (2001, p. 3) state that: “while 
ownership legally links an inanimate asset to a firm, complementarities 
economically link some person or unit that cannot be owned to the critical 
resource at the core of the firm”. Hence, when critical assets are human, the way 
to exercise authority relies on creating complementary links between a firm and 
the person or unit that the firm seeks to control. Thus, Rajan and Zingales (2001, 
p. 3) conclude that: “unlike ownership of unique alienable assets, which can be 
allocated simply by sale, control over other critical [animate] resources has to be 
built up through a variety of mechanisms such as internal organization, work rules, 
and incentive schemes. These mechanisms then induce complementarities 
between a resource and other resources.” This critical assets view of control could 
be summarized by the following proposition: the more important the intangible 
                                                 
§
 Critical assets are those that tie assets of the firm or organization together and 
are, hence, valuable.  
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human assets are for the generation of the network‟s residual income, the less 
ownership is an efficient (and sufficient) governance device. 
This approach can be applied to franchising networks. A number of intangible 
assets and/or knowledge assets, which are more or less critical to the networks 
value, are generated and used in franchise networks (Windsperger and Yurdakul 
2007). The franchisor offers know-how, business format and brand name whereas 
the franchisee provides local market knowledge and motivated managerial 
expertise. When these resources are put together in the network, they induce, more 
or less depending on their critical nature, complementarities. These 
complementarities can arise from the generation of information and management 
resources specific to plural form as shown by Bradach (1998). They can also take 
the form of a first mover advantage, which in turn increases the brand value 
(Michael 2003).  
Moreover, franchising in plural form networks can also be viewed as a governance 
device, which offers control over critical (human) resources through a variety of 
mechanisms. Powell (1990) presents network forms of organization as “neither 
market nor hierarchy”. Bradach and Eccles (1989) highlight the importance of 
trust between authority and price, which leads to plural form organizations. These 
mechanisms, which are specific to plural form networks, can be seen as a means to 
built complementarities based on the two mechanisms proposed by Rajan and 
Zingales: 1- granting access to resources and 2- favouring specialization. One 
form of building complementarities is to give franchisees (“human” assets of the 
firm) a privileged access to the enterprise‟s resources (concept, methods, outlets‟ 
results, information, decision rights or, at least, a right to examine strategic 
decisions, etc.) by transferring residual decision and residual income rights. This 
access is a necessary condition for the investment in human capital at the outlet 
level. Simultaneously, the franchisor has to strengthen its authority over the use of 
the critical network resources. Critical assets are the brand name assets and the 
human capital assets at the local market. Favouring firm-specific specialization for 
the franchisee can do this. This specialization does not deal with what is provided 
for in contracts (for instance, definition of customers‟ area, covenants against 
competition, exclusivity agreement, etc.) but it is rather based on: 
- the network information system (for instance, specializing the outlet in a 
specific reporting method or data exchange software could tie this outlet 
to the network as it cannot use these methods with other networks); 
- the socialisation of the networks (Bradach 1998) 
- the provision of materials, furniture, guarantees on sales or any other 
system which, if removed, would make the outlet value decrease in case 
that the franchisee should want to disengage from the network. 
Of course, franchise contracts can differ substantially in their terms, in their 
informal mechanisms of socialization and in their sharing of control rights 
between franchisees and franchisors. All franchise contracts do not have the same 
capacity to secure critical assets. But, beyond these differences, we can consider 
that franchising in a plural form network will be more efficient than ownership 
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when human intangible assets are valuable assets in the network. 
Our proposition is then straightforward: the more „critical‟ human and intangible 
assets are valuable to the network - that is the more these assets found the value of 
the network -, the more franchising will be an efficient governance structure for 
these assets. On the contrary, if human assets (not reported on the balance sheet) 
represent a small part of the firm‟s value, ownership should be preferred as an 
efficient governance structure. 
3 Hypotheses 
3.1 Plural Form and Critical Assets 
Following Rajan and Zingales (2000), it is considered that franchising, as a 
governance form, consists of a financial and organizational architecture 
(Windsperger and Dant 2006), which highlights the importance of human capital 
as a determinant of the governance structure. As argued above, the more valuable 
the intangible (human) assets are for the performance of the network, the higher 
the tendency toward franchisee-owned outlets is. Networks with a high value of 
intangible human assets should perform better with a high proportion of 
franchisee-owned units. The following hypothesis is derived: 
Hypothesis H1: The link between the proportion of franchisee-owned 
units (franchise proportion) and financial performance is greater for 
franchisors with a high value of intangible human assets than for 
franchisors with a low value of intangible human assets. 
3.2 Plural form and life cycle stage 
Franchising is traditionally presented as a means to overcome the scarcity of 
franchisor financial and managerial resources in the early stage of network 
development (Caves and Murphy 1976). As franchise networks become mature, 
they get easier access to resources, and the need for franchising should decrease. 
In addition, Bürkle and Posselt (2008) argue that, at the beginning of its life cycle, 
the franchisor lacks sufficient resources and is poorly diversified and therefore 
strongly risk averse. Initially outsourcing outlets through franchising provides 
particularly high savings in terms of risk costs for the franchisor. In contrast, 
networks that have reached an advanced stage in their life cycle tend to be less 
risk averse, and the risk costs have less significance for them. Efforts to save risk 
costs become commensurately low through the increasing proportion of 
franchisee-owned units. Consequently, a higher proportion of franchisee-owned 
units should enhance the franchisor‟s financial performance in early-stage 
networks. Conversely a negative impact was expected from the proportion of 
franchisee-owned units on financial performance for larger networks that have 
reached an advanced stage of their life cycle. The following hypothesis can be 
formulated: 
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Hypothesis H2: In the early (advanced) stages of the network 
development, the proportion of franchisee-owned units has a positive 
(negative) impact on a franchisor’s financial performance. 
But, as outlined by Srinivasan (2006), when most high potential markets are 
covered by a firm's existing distribution system, its expansion may be limited to 
smaller, remote markets, market-based channels could be more efficient. Hence, 
the effect of life cycle stage on the franchising/performance relationship in 
advanced stages is unclear. For advanced life cycle stages, the effect of the 
proportion of franchisee-owned units on performance could be non-linear: it could 
reverse, or become curvilinear.  
4 Method 
4.1 Data 
Franchising networks are expanding in Europe. The latest figures provided by the 
European Franchise Federation (2008) show that there are no less than 9,750 
franchising networks in Europe. 
In this study, the focus is on publicly held franchisors in Europe. The initial 
sample of publicly held franchisors is built on information collected from various 
organizations (national franchise associations, franchise magazines) via their 
websites. Whether or not the largest franchisors in Europe (as listed at: 
http://www.franchiseeurope.com/top500/) were publicly held was also checked. A 
sample of 80 publicly held franchisors was, thus, obtained. Some of these 
franchisors were subsidiaries of publicly held firms. When the franchising activity 
was a marginal activity in the firm, it was not retained in the sample. Although 
they are listed on a stock exchange in Europe, some networks are non-European 
and have only a small part of their activities in European markets; they have been 
deleted from the database as well. Other data limitations, especially concerning 
the number of outlets, reduce the final sample to 41 franchisors. The model is 
estimated using panel data on 41 publicly listed European franchising networks in 
the 1998-2007 period, resulting in 237 firm-year observations (41 firms x the 
number of years of observation for each firm). The focus is on the European 
market at a multi-industry-level, contrary to previous studies, which have mainly 
analyzed the US market in one specific industry. Data was obtained from various 
sources. Financial and accounting data were obtained from the Worldscope 
database. The data on the number of units and employees were obtained from the 
firms‟ annual reports and several franchising websites. In some cases, franchisors 
were contacted directly by email and/or by telephone to complete our information. 
Some firms entered after 1998 or exited before 2007, reducing the number of firm 
years. The average number of firm years was 5.78 (minimum = 1 year; 
maximum= 10 years). Most data stem from French franchisors, as there are 151 
observations from 29 franchisors in France. There are also 20 observations from 
three UK franchisors, 17 observations from two German franchisors, 15 
observations from three Italian franchisors, 10 observations from Belgium, nine 
from the Netherlands, eight from Spain, and seven from Denmark (only one firm 
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concerns the latter countries). Industry classification schemes of Datastream were 
adopted. Firms in the sample are distributed across 13 industries. Clothing is the 
first, with 67 observations, followed by mass-distribution and special retail, with 
37 observations each, restaurants, with 31 observations, do-it-yourself stores, 21 
observations, and hotels, 10 observations. All other sectors (medical, real estate, 
travel, financial services, material, audio and video product and education) have 
less than 10 observations. 
4.2 Measurement scales 
It is assumed that franchising has the same legal definition throughout the selected 
European countries even though in some of them franchising can be defined 
differently (Dant et al. 2008). The proportion of a network‟s franchised units to 
the total number of its units in its distribution system is used as the indicator of its 
plural form (franchise proportion). This is a continuous measure bounded between 
0 (only owned units) and 1 (only franchised units). Following an instrumental 
approach (Jones 1995), the network‟s performance is measured at the franchisor 
level by its industry-adjusted return on assets. Industry-adjusted return on assets is 
the return on assets of each company in the sample minus the industry‟s median 
return on assets
**
.  
A relative stock market valuation measure of human capital intangibles proposed 
by Pantzalis and Park (2009) is used. The excess value of a franchisor‟s human 
capital (EVHC) “i” is measured as the natural log of the ratio of firm‟s market 
value of common equity (V) per employee (EMP) to the industry‟s median (m) 
value of market value of common equity per employee:  

EVHC i,t  ln
V
EMP






i,t
V
EMP






m,t












 
 
Following Pantzalis and Park (2009), it is assumed that EVHC reflects the 
market‟s assessment of the quality of the human capital employed by the 
franchisor. EVHC is used as a continuous variable, but a dummy variable is also 
used (EVHC=1), which takes on the values 1 for high human capital (EVHC 
above the median) and 0 for low human capital (EVHC below the median).  
                                                 
**
 Datastream database provides, for each firm, related companies for comparison 
purposes. These related companies are defined according to their industry. For one 
franchisor in our sample (Bang and Olufsen, audio and video product, group code 
“CNELE” in Datastream), Datastream does not provide related companies in the 
EU. For this company, performance and human capital measures are adjusted with 
the median of the total sample of related companies.  
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The life cycle stage has already been used to show the evolution of growth in 
control and profitability in franchise systems (Anderson 1984). It is also a key 
concept concerning cooperative relationships between firms (Jap and Anderson 
2007) even though one should be aware of an eventual dark side in relationships 
that are too close (Anderson and Jap 2005). It is proxied here by both categorical 
and continuous variables based on the franchisor‟s age (the number of years since 
its incorporation). Age is an imperfect proxy of life cycle stage but this variable, 
which is easily available, is often used in franchising literature regarding 
franchising rate and/or performance (Barthélemy 2008; Lafontaine and Shaw 
2005; Perrigot et al. 2009). The franchisor‟s age was first used to create dummy 
variables. The first variable, named cycleage1, takes only two values: 0 for 
franchisors whose age is below the median, 1 for franchisors whose age is above 
the median. As the impact of the life cycle could be non-linear, a variable called 
cycleage2 was also created, which takes on three values. Franchisors are, thus, 
classified into tertiles (thirds). The variable cycleage2 takes on the values 0 for the 
youngest franchisors in the sample (first tertile), 1 for middle-aged franchisors 
(second tertile) and 2 for the oldest franchisors (third tertile). Age is also used as a 
continuous interaction and control variable in the regression analysis. 
The control variables are the franchisor‟s size (natural log of total assets), 
financial leverage (long-term debt to total assets), and internationalization 
(number of domestic outlets to total number of outlets). Table 1 contains the 
descriptive statistics and Table 2 presents the correlations matrix of the measures. 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics (N = 237) 
Variable 
Industry-
adjusted 
ROA 
Franchise 
proportion Size 
Financial 
leverage International 
 
 
Age 
Mean -2.5970 0.5021 12.7364 0.1561 0.6777 
 
 
42 
Median -1.2900 0.4509 12.4823 0.1302 0.7558 
 
 
36 
Maximum 44.7300 0.9990 17.7471 0.5969 1.0000 
 
 
109 
 
Minimum -80.7100 0.0000 8.4879 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
3 
Std. Dev. 10.8500 0.3236 2.0678 0.1208 0.3112 
 
 
26.0604 
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Table 2  
Correlation matrix (N = 237) 
Variable 
 (t-stat) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Industry-
adjusted ROA 
 1.0000 
       
 
2. Franchise 
proportion 
 
 0.0269 
(0,41) 
 
 1.0000 
 
      
3. EVHC 
 
 
 0.1812** 
(2.82) 
 
 0.3108** 
(5.01) 
 
 1.0000 
 
     
4. Age 
 
  
 0.0099 
(0.15) 
 
 0.0317 
(0.49) 
 
 -0.0179 
(-0.27) 
 
 1.0000 
 
    
5. Size 
 
 
 0.0544 
(0.83) 
 
 0.0485 
(0,74) 
 
 0.1552* 
(2.41) 
 
0.3780** 
(6.26) 
 
 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
  
7. Financial 
leverage 
 
0.0026 
(0,04) 
 
-0.2654** 
(-4.22) 
 
-0.1585** 
(-2.46) 
 
0.1565** 
(2.42) 
 
 0.2284** 
(3.60) 
 
 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
8. International 
 
 -0.0105 
(-0.16) 
-0.2502** 
(-3.96) 
-0.0398 
(-0.61) 
 -0.1976** 
(-3.09) 
-0.3205** 
(-5.18) 
0.0835 
(1.29) 
1.0000 
 
*p< .05.  **p< .01. 
The correlations were within acceptable limits (highest correlation = 0.378 
between size and age). Potential threats from multicollinearity were assessed.. The 
variance inflation factors were lower than 10, suggesting that multicollinearity is 
not a threat to the validity of the study‟s findings. 
5 Results 
We first test the hypotheses considering the impact of franchise proportion on 
performance using the interaction variables (age and human capital) as dummy 
variables (Table 3). To check these results, similar models were used, but using 
continuous variables for age and human capital (Table 4). All the regressions are 
estimated using a cross-section fixed effect, as a redundant fixed effect test 
showed that this specification was better than time-effect or no fixed effect. 
Model I includes only franchise proportion and control variables (Table 3). A 
direct relationship between the proportion of franchised outlets and performance is 
not hypothesized, but rather a contingent relationship to human capital value and 
age. The regression coefficient for franchise proportion is not significant. The only 
significant variable is age, which positively impacts the franchisor‟s performance. 
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Table 3 
Results for the Model Relating a Franchisor’s Plural Form to Its 
Performance Using Categorical Interaction Variables 
Panel data regressions of industry-adjusted Return on Assets on network‟s 
franchise proportion, categorical variables regarding human capital and 
franchisor‟s age, and control variables. All regressions are estimated including a 
cross-section fixed effect. 
 
Variable Model I Model  
II 
Model III 
Constant 
 
-56.3451* 
(-1.93) 
-73.5134** 
(-2.48) 
-69.1959** 
(-2.34) 
Franchise proportion 
 
6.6269 
(1.03) 
10.2083 
(1.38) 
7.1139 
(0.95) 
AGE 
 
0.8699** 
(2.87) 
0.9378*** 
(3.06) 
0.7669** 
(2.48) 
EVHC 
 
2.2262 
(1.47) 
0.6220 
(0.36) 
0.5485 
(0.31) 
Franchise proportion x EVHC=1 
 
 11.2153** 
(2.32) 
10.0148** 
(2.15) 
Franchise proportion x cycleage1 
 
 -10.0670 
(-1.50) 
 
Franchise proportion x 
cycleage2=1 
  -7.5945 
(-1.10) 
Franchise proportion x 
cycleage2=2 
  -1.8786 
(-0.23) 
Size 
 
1.3138 
(0.57) 
2.1294 
(0.92) 
2.3142 
(1.00) 
Financial Leverage 
 
-6.767378 
(-0.72) 
-3.8662 
(-0.41) 
-5.3584 
(-0.57) 
Internationalization 
 
-2.626115 
(-0.33) 
0.2132 
(0.02) 
1.5215 
(0.19) 
N= 237 237 237 
R-squared 0.3901 0.4090 0.4097 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2425 0.2582 0.2551 
S.E. of regression 9.4435 9.3451 9.3646 
Sum squared resid 16944.10 16418.24 16399.03 
Log likelihood -842.2378 -838.5019 -838.3632 
F-statistic 2.64 2.71 2.64 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Akaike info criterion 7.5041 7.4894 7.4967 
Schwarz criterion 8.1919 8.2064 8.2284 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.7813 7.7785 7.7916 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.6206 1.7437 1.6698 
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01 
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Models II and III include the interaction (categorical) variables. They relate the 
franchisor‟s performance to the franchise proportion and the interactions between 
franchise proportion and intangible human capital and between franchise 
proportion and age. Results show that, for franchisors whose value relies heavily 
on intangible human assets (EVHC=1), the impact of franchise proportion is 
significantly greater. Hence, the franchise proportion effect on performance 
depends on the value of franchisors‟ human capital, verifying H1. On the contrary, 
results do not show any differential effect of the franchise proportion on 
performance depending on the life cycle stage. Results do not corroborate H2. 
Using Wald tests, the effect of franchise proportion on performance depending on 
the human capital and stage in the life cycle can be estimated. Results show that, 
whatever the model (II or III), franchise proportion has a positive impact on 
performance (at 5% level) for youngest franchisors with high human capital. But, 
this impact is no longer significant as franchisors mature
††
. Finally, for franchisors 
with a low human capital value, results do not show any significant effect of 
franchise proportion on performance. 
These first results are completed, by testing models with continuous measures of 
contingent variables (Table 4). Models IV and V are estimated on the same sample 
as previous models. What strikes at first glance in comparison to previous results 
is the positive direct effect of franchise proportion on performance. Barthélemy 
(2008) found a similar result on transversal data. Other results are in line with 
previous ones. The interaction between franchise proportion and human capital is 
positive, supporting H1. Moreover, a test for redundancy of the interaction of 
human capital and franchise proportion variables shows that this variable 
significantly improves the regression. Hence, the effect of franchise proportion on 
performance is moderated by the franchisor‟s human capital. The effect of the 
interaction between franchise proportion and age is negative but insignificant, or 
weakly significant. In model IV we include these interactions directly (franchise 
proportion*age), and it is not significant. Different specifications are then tested to 
take into account that this interaction effect may not be linear as noted above. 
Only specifications that include square or cubic form of age show (weakly) 
significant results. Model V, which presents the results with age squared as 
interaction variable, improves the quality of the regression in comparison with 
model IV marginally. It seems that the older the franchisor is, the more franchise 
proportion impacts negatively performance. But the significance of the coefficient 
is quite weak to confidently support H2. It is difficult to conclude that age is a 
contingent variable in the franchise proportion/performance relationship, results 
clearly show, like in other models, that age has a direct positive effect on the 
                                                 
††
This variable is still slightly (at 10% level) positive in Model III but only for the 
oldest franchisors, not for the middle-aged franchisors. 
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industry-adjusted performance. This result could be explained by a “survivor 
bias”, weaker franchisors disappear so that older franchisors are those that 
outperform their counterparts- and may not reflect causality. 
Overall, our early and exploratory results support hypothesis H1 and provide 
support for the contention that the performance of franchise chains is contingent 
on the „fit‟ between governance structure (franchise proportion) and resources 
(critical human assets). However, strong evidence that the 
governance/performance relationship is contingent on life cycle stage or 
franchisor‟s age was not found.  
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Table 4 
Results for the Model Relating a Franchisor’s Plural Form to Its 
Performance Using Continuous Interaction Variables 
Panel data regressions of industry-adjusted Return on Assets on network‟s 
franchise proportion, continuous variables regarding human capital and 
franchisor‟s age, and control variables. All regressions are estimated including a 
cross-section fixed effect. 
 
Variable Model IV Model  
V 
Constant 
 
-59.1311** 
(-2.06) 
-59.4497** 
(-2.08) 
Franchise proportion 
 
29.3677** 
(2.44) 
22.2505*** 
(2.70) 
AGE 
 
1.2738*** 
(3.69) 
1.3561*** 
(3.83) 
EVHC 
 
-3.9829 
(-1.52) 
-3.7265 
(-1.45) 
Franchise proportion x EVHC 
 
11.8912*** 
(2.88) 
11.3579*** 
(2.86) 
Franchise proportion x age 
 
-0.4642 
(-1.61) 
 
Franchise proportion x age^2 
 
 -0.0054* 
(-1.90) 
Size 
 
-0.0166 
(-0.0072) 
-0.2596 
(-0.11) 
Financial Leverage 
 
-6.6732 
(-0.73) 
-6.91 
(-0.75) 
Internationalization 
 
-3.3123 
(-0.42) 
-2.9990 
(-0.38) 
N= 237 237 
R-squared 0.4171 0.4202 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2682 0.2722 
S.E. of regression 9.2816 9.2564 
Sum squared resid 16195.70 16107.89 
Log likelihood -836.88 -836.24 
F-statistic 2.80 2.84 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 
Akaike info criterion 7.4758 7.4704 
Schwarz criterion 8.1928 8.1874 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.7648 7.7594 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.74 1.75 
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01 
6 Discussion and conclusion 
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Despite the growing importance of plural form networks in practice, there are few 
insights into their financial performance implications. This article explores the 
relationship between plural form and financial performance, and concludes with a 
discussion of the theoretical contributions, managerial implications, and 
limitations and opportunities for further research. 
6.1 Theoretical Contributions 
First, by relating plural form to financial performance, this article addresses the 
call for research on the performance implications of plural governance in general 
(Heide 2003) with a focus on plural form networks (Bradach 1997). The findings 
indicate that the impact of franchise proportion on performance is greater for 
franchisors with high human capital value compared to franchisors with low 
human capital value. Overall, early results provide support for the contention that 
the performance of franchise chains is contingent on the „fit‟ between governance 
structure (franchise proportion) and resources (critical human assets). In contrast, 
strong evidence that the governance/performance relationship is contingent on life 
cycle stage or franchisor‟s age is not found. But, our results suggest that 
franchisor‟s age could weaken the relationship between franchise proportion and 
performance. These results might suggest that younger franchisors with high 
human capital should increase their franchise proportion to enhance their financial 
performance.  
Second, as far as currently known, this is the first substantial and empirical study 
of the plural form on a non-Anglo-Saxon market. Indeed, most of the previous 
papers dealing with franchising focus on Anglo-Saxon countries and, as far as the 
plural form networks are concerned, they mainly deal with the USA. Here, the 
empirical study concerns the European franchising market and compares various 
industries, mainly in the retail and services sectors. 
6.2 Managerial Implications 
The study‟s findings can be of interest for practitioners: when the franchisors and 
the franchisees, have respectively to choose to develop and to join a franchising 
network. From the franchisors‟ point of view, it seems that young franchisors with 
high human capital value can improve their performance by increasing their 
franchise proportion. This is not the case for other franchisors, especially as they 
mature. Assuming that this franchisor‟s performance impact is not due to a wealth 
transfer between franchisees and franchisors, it could help franchisees to choose 
their network. Franchise stakeholders will be able to take into account the various 
advantages of plural form within their choice process: the choice of the 
organizational form by the franchisor and the choice of the network form by the 
franchisees which consider the franchise proportion an important issue 
(Lafontaine 1992). These results reinforce the existence of synergies provided by 
the coexistence of franchising and company ownership within the same network, 
and also highlight some of its limits. 
6.3 Limitations and Opportunities for Further Research 
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The study‟s sample (N=41), though close to the total population of listed 
franchising networks in Europe, is small. This is detrimental to the significance of 
the results and it raises questions about the generalizability of the study‟s findings. 
Further research on performance in plural form networks with larger sample sizes 
would represent useful extensions, but some insights may improve quality of the 
results. 
One of the explanatory variables in this study is the franchisor‟s life cycle stage, 
as (roughly) measured by age and categories based on franchisor‟s age. Research 
extensions using alternative life cycle stage measures, including sales growth, 
would both complement and extend the study‟s findings. Moreover, arguments 
from resource and risk-based theories lead to a prediction that franchise proportion 
will have decreasing (or negative) impacts on performance, as the franchisor 
matures. Weak evidence is found to support this idea. Hence, in the models using 
dummy variables, the positive impact of franchise proportion on performance for 
the franchisors with a high human capital value becomes less significant as the 
franchisor gets older. In the models using continuous variables, some weak 
evidence is found regarding a negative impact of age on the franchise 
proportion/performance relationship.  
The critical nature of human capital may vary over time, according to franchisor‟s 
age or life cycle stage. The impact of human capital on the franchise 
proportion/performance relationship may thus vary over time. Although this idea 
was not developed in this study, a three-way interaction among human capital 
value, franchise proportion, and age on chain performance (see Barthélemy 2008 
with other variables) could be helpful to address this issue. More broadly, the 
“time-varying” power of existing theories to explain the benefits of franchising in 
various life cycle phases of the franchisor is an issue to explore.  
In this study, plural form in franchising is viewed as a governance device 
dissociating ownership and decision rights, which is more efficient than full 
ownership when human capital is high in the networks. Actually, this may not 
always be the case: there may be some ways to reconcile ownership and decision 
rights in the network, even if the network exhibits an apparent high franchise 
proportion. Multi-franchising (ownership of multiple outlets in the network by one 
or more franchisees) can be such an organizational form, as it confers more power 
to the franchisee with regard to the franchisor (Kaufmann and Dant 1996), and 
can, hence, reconcile decision and ownership rights. Control for variables, such as 
multi-franchising should be taken into account as they can alter the results. But, 
this is not publicly available information (at least for a large part of our sample 
regarding multi-franchising), and including such control variables requires new 
data collection methods. 
Finally, our empirical tests rely on regressions with interaction effects between 
franchise proportion and life cycle stage or human capital value. Other empirical 
methodologies would extend the study‟s results. Srinivasan (2006) uses latent 
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class regression, which organizes the sample‟s observations into classes and 
estimates regression models within each class. This methodology could be used on 
the sample, using human capital and life cycle stage as variables to constitute the 
latent classes.  
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